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Abstract
A model is considered in which optimal search intensity is a result
of a trade oﬀ between short run losses due to higher search costs (more
interviews, commuting...) and long-run gains due to a higher chance of
ﬁnding a job. We show that this optimal search intensity is higher in
areas characterized by larger cost of living and/or higher labor market
tightness. This model is then tested for England on sub-regional data.
We estimate a spatial error model and we ﬁnd that both the local cost of
living and the local labor market tightness are found to have a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on unemployed average search intensity. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.
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11 Introduction
There seems to be a growing awareness that some patterns of economic vari-
ables might be due to spatial rather than purely economic factors. This is par-
ticularly true in the labor market (see, for example, Topa, 2001 and Manning,
2003) and more especially for job search activities since a spatial dispersion of
a g e n t sc r e a t e sm o r ef r i c t i o n sa n dt h u sm o r eu n e m p l o y m e n t .
The aim of this paper is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically,
the relationship between job search and space by focusing on the impact of
local cost of living and local labor market tightness on search activities. We
believe that the understanding of these relationships is crucial for regional
policies.
From a theoretical point of view, few models have introduced a spatial
analysis in a search-matching model. Exceptions include Seater (1979), Mc-
Cormick and Sheppard (1992), Rouwendal (1998), Ortega (2000), Coulson,
Laing and Wang (2001), Sato (2001), Wasmer and Zenou (2002), Smith and
Zenou (2003). Contrary to these models, our focus is on search intensity and
its relationship with cost of living and labor market tightness in a local labor
market.
From an empirical point of view, few papers have tested spatial search
models. Most of the related empirical literature focuses on the aggregation
of the matching function across space and on the interaction between local
matching and regional migration or commuting behavior (see in particular the
survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, and also Jackman and Savouri,
1992, Burda and Proﬁt, 1996, Burgess and Proﬁt, 2001). In the present paper,
we analyze a diﬀerent issue, namely the relationship between the local average
job-search intensity, on the one hand, and the local cost of living and/or the
local labor market tightness, on the other.
To be more precise, we ﬁrst develop a simple model in which optimal search
intensity is a result of a trade oﬀ between short run losses due to higher cost of
search eﬀort (more interviews, commuting...) and long-run gains due to higher
chance to ﬁnd a job. We show that this optimal search intensity is higher in ar-
eas characterized by larger cost of living and/or higher labor market tightness.
The intuition is as follows. When the cost of living increases, workers consume
less and thus have more leisure both when they are employed and unemployed.
However, because the employed are assumed to value more leisure than the un-
employed, the diﬀerence in intertemporal utility between the employed and the
unemployed increases, and as a result, the unemployed workers search more
2actively because the reward of a successful match is higher. Similarly, when
the labor market tightness rises, it becomes easier to ﬁnd a job (there are rela-
tively more jobs available compared to the unemployed) and thus the returns
to search are higher. As a result, workers put more eﬀort in search activities.
Empirical support for this predictions is found in a British panel of sub-
regional data for the year 2000. A spatial lag model is estimated. Once spatial
eﬀects and the inﬂuence of diﬀerent area-speciﬁc characteristics have been
controlled for, both the cost of living and the labor market tightness are found
to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the unemployed search intensity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model and its main predictions. Section 3 describes the data, the
empirical models and the estimation results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
We develop a simple model that explains how search eﬀort decisions are made
and how cost of living and labor market tightness inﬂuence this choice.
Let us ﬁrst explain the macroeconomic environment. Time is continuous
and workers live forever. All workers are ex ante identical. A vacancy can be
ﬁlled according to a random Poisson process. Similarly, unemployed workers
can ﬁnd a job according to a random Poisson process. In aggregate, these
processes imply that there is a number of contacts (or matches) per unit of
time between the two sides of the market that are determined by the following
standard matching function:
M ≡ M(sU,V ) (1)
where U and V respectively denote the number of unemployed workers and
vacancies. Each unemployed worker k =1 ,...,U has a search intensity equal
to sk. Accordingly, s represents the average intensity of search of the U unem-
ployed workers. As usual (Pissarides, 2000), M(.) is assumed to be increasing
in both its arguments, concave and exhibits constant returns to scale. As a
result, the probability of obtaining a job for an unemployed worker k with








where θ = V/U is the labor market tightness. By using the properties of the




3since more vacancies in the area increase the probability to ﬁnd a job whereas
more unemployed workers decreases this probability.












Equations (3) and (4) express the search externalities that are present in
this model. The higher the unemployed who are searching for a job, the easier
is to ﬁll a vacancy but the more diﬃcult is to ﬁnd a job. Similarly, the higher
the vacant ﬁrms that are searching for a worker, the easier is to ﬁnd a job but
the more diﬃcult is to ﬁll a vacancy.
We now focus on the behavior of an unemployed worker that searches for
a job and analyze how this behavior is aﬀected by factors related to his/her
residential location, such as living costs and the tightness of the local labor
market.
Let us ﬁrst determine the instantaneous utility function. Let us denote
by the superscript ‘0’ the unemployed group and by the superscript ‘1’ the











j j =0 ,1 (5)
where 0 < αj < 1,a n dlj and zj are respectively leisure and composite good
consumptions for workers of type j =0 ,1. We assume that α1 > α0,w h i c h
means that, for the same amount of leisure, employed workers value more
leisure than unemployed workers or equivalently they value less the composite
good consumption (1 − α1 < 1 − α0). This is because working is a more
stressful activity than searching and leisure is a scarcer ‘resource’ for those
who are employed. As a result, leisure for the employed (i.e. time spent non
working) is more valued than leisure for the unemployed (i.e. time spent non
searching). The budget constraint of an employed worker is given by
wT = hz
1 (6)
where w is the per-hour wage, h is the price of the composite good or equiv-
alently the cost of living and T denotes the amount of working hours. T
is assumed to be the same and constant across workers, an assumption that
4agrees with most jobs in the vast majority of developed countries. Each worker
provides a ﬁxed amount of labor time T.T h u s ,t h et i m ec o n s t r a i n to fa ne m -
ployed worker can be written as:
1 − T = l
1 (7)
in which the total amount of time is normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
Observe that, since total time is one, l1 is the fraction of time spent in leisure.
By plugging (6) and (7) in (5), we obtain the following indirect utility for
the employed workers:
V
1 ≡ V (w,h)=α










Concerning the unemployed, the utility is given by (5). For an unemployed




where b is the unemployment beneﬁta n dC(sk) is the total cost of searching
for jobs. The latter encompasses the costs of buying newspapers, commuting
contacting friends, phone calls, interviews... We assume that
C
0(sk) > 0 ,C
00(sk) > 0 (10)
i.e. more search eﬀort implies more search costs and it is even more costly at
the margin (convex function). The time constraint is equal to:
l
0
k + sk =1 (11)
In this formulation, the leisure time for unemployed workers is taken to include
all time spent not searching for work. Thus, the expected fraction of leisure
time for an unemployed worker with search intensity, sk,i ss i m p l y1 − sk.
By plugging (9) and (11) in (5), we obtain the following indirect utility
function for the unemployed with search intensity sk:
V
0 ≡ V (b,h,sk)=α










We are now equipped to write W0
k, the expected discounted lifetime utility
of an unemployed worker with search intensity sk and W1, the expected dis-
counted lifetime utility of an employed worker (Bellman equation). In steady-






























































where r ∈ (0,1) is the discount rate and δ is the job destruction rate. Equa-
tion (13) has a standard interpretation. When a worker is unemployed today,
he/she obtains an instantaneous (indirect) utility equals to V 0. Then, he/she
can get a job with a probability
sk
s M(s,θ) and, if so, obtains an increase in
utility of W1 − W0
k. Equation (14) has a similar interpretation.





V 1 − V 0
r + δ + M(s,θ)sk/s
(15)
Let us now study the search eﬀort decision. When making this decision, the
unemployed takes as given the total unemployment level U,t h et o t a ln u m b e r
of vacancies V (and thus θ = V/U the labor market tightness), the cost of
living h and the expected discounted lifetime utilities W0
k and W1.










































k is the unique solution of this maximization problem.
Let us give the intuition of (16). When choosing s∗
k, there is a fundamental
trade-oﬀ between short-run and long-run beneﬁt sf o ra nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r .
On the one hand, increasing search eﬀort sk is costly in the short run (more
phone calls, more interviews, less leisure) as it decreases instantaneous util-
ity (∂V 0/∂sk < 0), but, on the other, it increases the long-run prospects of
employment (M(s,θ)(W1
k − W0
k)/s is the marginal return of employment).
At the symmetric equilibrium, all workers provide the same search intensity
so that s∗
k = s∗ = s∗. Thus, using (15), equation (16) can be written as
α
0 1








V 1 − V 0
r + δ + M(s∗,θ)
(17)
1See Lemma 1 in Appendix 1 that shows that there is a unique solution to this maxi-
mization problem.
6We assume that wages w, the number of job created V , the unemployment
level U,a n dt h u sθ are given.2 O u rm a i nr e s u l ti sa sf o l l o w s :
Proposition 1
(i) The higher the cost of living h, the higher the average search intensity
s∗ = s∗
k of the unemployed workers.
(ii) The higher the labor market tightness θ, i.e. the higher the number of va-
cancies V or the lower the unemployment level U, the higher the average
search intensity s∗ = s∗
k of the unemployed workers.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
As stated above, when deciding the optimal level of search eﬀort, each
unemployed worker trades oﬀ the short run losses of increasing eﬀort (higher
cost of search eﬀort C(sk) and less leisure time and thus lower instantaneous
utility V 0) with the long-run gains (higher chance to get a job and to enjoy
an intertemporal utility diﬀerence between employment and unemployment).
Proposition 1 analyzes the eﬀect of living costs h (short-run eﬀect) and the
o n eo ft h el a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s sθ (long-run eﬀect) on search eﬀort s∗
k and
average search intensity s∗.
When costs of living h increase, workers reduce their composite consump-
tion both when they are employed and unemployed. However, because the
employed value more leisure (α1 > α0) and thus less composite good con-
sumption (1 − α1 < 1 − α0) than the unemployed, the diﬀerence in instan-
taneous utility V 1 − V 0 increases since the unemployed are more aﬀected by
this increase in h than the employed. Now, because, the marginal intertem-
poral utility diﬀerence between employment and unemployment (W1 − W0
k)
is equal to the marginal instantaneous utility diﬀerence between employment
and unemployment (V 1 − V 0
k ), i.e.




∂ (V 1 − V 0
k )
∂h
2In fact, to endogeneize these variables and to close the model is quite easy since it suﬃces
to add a free entry condition for θ, a wage bargaining determination for w and a steady-state
ﬂows in and ﬂows out equation for U. This is now standard (Pissarides, 2000). However,
the aim of the theory is to shed some light on the relationship between local average search
activity and local characteristics by providing a mechanism for the link between s∗ and h
and between s∗ and θ, for a given wage and a given unemployment level, that can be easily
tested. In the empirical analysis, wages are used as control variables.
7an increase in costs of living h raises W1 − W0
k and, as a result, unemployed
workers search more actively because of better returns to search.
Similarly, when the labor market tightness θ rises, it becomes easier to ﬁnd
a job (there are relatively more jobs available compared to the unemployed)
and thus the returns to search are higher. As a result, workers put more eﬀort
in search activities.
More generally, the basic message of this model is as follows. If we compare
two areas (counties, cities, regions), then, controlling for wages and workers’
characteristics, the unemployed workers living either in the more expensive
area and/or in the area with the higher labor market tightness, search more
on average.
3 Empirical Analysis
The aim of this empirical investigation is to test the results of Proposition
1, namely the positive relationships between s∗ and h and between s∗ and θ.
Figure 1 shows three quantile maps that depicts the geographical distribution
of the search rate (ﬁrst panel), the tightness of the local labor markets (panel
on the left) and our proxy for costs of living, i.e. house prices, (panel on the
right) in England at the NUTS3 level of spatial disaggregation for the year
2000. It appears evident that most of the areas with high (low) levels of local
search rate are the areas with high (low) levels of local labor market and cost
of living.
Our empirical strategy is to estimate the impact of the local cost of living
and the local labor market tightness on the average search intensity, once the
inﬂuence of other area speciﬁc characteristics (skill composition, population
structure, economic activity, sectorial composition, quality of the unemployed,
income and wealth, ethnic composition, (time) distance to jobs, motor vehicle
usage, agglomeration eﬀects, social networks) and spatial eﬀects have been
controlled for.























Our empirical analysis is based on NUTS3 level data in England.3 The main
data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS hereafter). Given an area, the
key variables under investigation are the (average) search intensity, the local
cost of living and the local labor market tightness.
We deﬁne the average search intensity in area i, si ,a st h er a t i ob e t w e e n
active job seekers, and the sum of active job seekers and inactive persons living
in the area.4 Observe that, in order to obtain a variable capturing a positive
behavior of jobless people in the search process, our deﬁnition of active job
seekers (the numerator in our measure of local search intensity) includes both
the unemployed (these are job seekers who are immediately available for a
job) and the persons who declare themselves as job seekers but are currently
unavailable to start working (thus deﬁned inactive according to the standard
ILO deﬁnition of economic activity) for no valid reason.
The other key variable in the theoretical model, the average cost of living
in area i, hi, is measured by a house price index. We are aware that the
interactions between the labor market and the housing market are far more
complicated (see e.g. Hughes and McCormick, 2000, Cameron and Muellbauer,
2001). However, because there is no complete set of sub-regional price indices
for the UK, the main (and possibly the only) source of variation in prices within
r e g i o n si sd i ﬀerences in house prices. Furthermore, we exclude home-owners
so that we rule out the possibility individuals can consider houses as assets.
Finally, the last variable of theoretical interest is the local labor market
tightness θi. The National On-line Manpower Information Service (NOMIS)
provides information of the labor market tightness at the county level.
In order to control for diﬀerences in skill composition, population struc-
ture, economic activity, sectorial composition, income and wealth, ethnic com-
position, job access, car access, agglomeration eﬀects, social networks among
NUTS3 areas, we include as regressors in our empirical model indicators of
3The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) was established by the Sta-
tistical Oﬃce of the European Communities (Eurostat) to provide a single, uniform break-
down of territorial units for the production of Community regional statistics. In Britain,
NUTS3 administrative areas are smaller than counties. For example, in the metropolitan
area of London, there are ﬁve NUTS3 areas.
4The ideal variable to measure search eﬀort would have been, at the individual level, the
number of hours spent looking for a job. Unfortunately, this variable is not available in any
British survey. This is why we resort to our aggregate indicator of search intensity and, as a
result, all our empirical analysis will be conducted at an aggregate level (i.e. NUTS3 area).
9education, age, economic activity, employment by occupation, indices of earn-
ings by occupation and home ownership, ethnicity, (time) distance to jobs,
motor vehicle usage, population density, main method of job search of people
living in the area respectively.5 For a complete description of all the data, see
Appendix 2.
In order to avoid that diﬀerences in earnings across areas are due to the
composition of the labor force in the areas, we use a ﬁxed weight index of
earnings (where the weights are the share of each occupation in total UK
employment). Similarly, in order to avoid that diﬀerences in house prices
across areas are due to diﬀerent types of houses being sold in the areas, we
also use a ﬁxed weight house prices index (where the weights are the share of
each type of houses sales in total UK sales of houses). The construction of
both indices is detailed in Appendix 3. Appendix 5 contains the list of the 85
NUTS3 administrative areas considered in the analysis.6 Precise deﬁnitions of
all variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in Appendix 2. Table
1 contains the summary statistics.
5Because the LFS sub-regional data are made available only starting from spring 2000
and earnings data are only available until year 2000, all variables are year 2000 annual
averages. All data can be obtained on line from the NOMIS database run by the University
of Durham (on behalf of the Oﬃce for National Statistics: http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/)
or in the ESRC Data Archive (www.data-archive.ac.uk) with the exception of house prices,
that are available on line from the HM Land Registry (http://www.landreg.gov.uk/).
6Some NUTS3 areas have been aggregated due to lack of data on some of the variables.
Also, all the empirical analysis presented in the paper has been performed excluding London
before the housing market is quite peculiar.
10Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
¯ s 85 0.61 0.38 0 1
h 85 78.99 43.7 34.6 179.89
θ 85 0.2 0.18 0.05 1.2
t
∗ 85 48.9 36.5 5 150
c 85 67.8 27.79 33.76 91.06
u 85 46.66 29.97 9.99 65.32
h_ow 85 61 20.18 10.1 92.4
d 85 893.98 1409.8 14.8 9950.01
network 85 58.01 7.57 9.2 72.2
whites 85 84.64 8.57 75.99 98.06
a 85 84.04 4.62 72.33 91.01
skills3+ 85 56.31 16.68 33.33 74.56
y16 − 24 85 7.91 5.1 3.4 17.3
y25 − 49 85 27.22 3.25 20 37.2
y50 − 64 85 49.7 4.98 22.5 69.3
e_123 85 34.5 15.90 15 49
e_67 85 72.2 16.2 43 88
e_89 85 60.5 29.3 25 86
w_123 85 93.88 8.51 79.17 114.50
w_45 85 97.82 7.52 87.57 115.18
w_67 85 97.97 7.57 82.16 119.99
w_89 85 99.61 9.07 83.36 135.52
∗ This time corresponds to a return trip in minutes.
3.2 Statistical model and estimation results
We use a regression model with a spatial autoregressive process for the error
term. We write the model by separating the target variables from the other
control variables for sake of clarity:7
s = δh + γϑ+ Xβ + ε, (18)
ε = λPε + ξ (19)
7Theoretical details on the spatial error model can be found, among others, in Anselin
(1988).
11where s, h and ϑ are N × 1 vectors of observations (N =8 5 ,t h en u m b e ro f
areas considered) on the search rate, cost of living and labor market tightness
respectively, X is a N × k matrix of observations on the control variables
(including a constant term), ε is a N × 1 vector of normally distributed error
terms, Pε is a N × 1 vector of spatial lags for the errors, that is obtained
by setting the elements of the matrix P, pij, equal to 0 if i = j or if i and
j are not adjacent, and equal to a constant otherwise (deﬁned by imposing
the normalization
Pn
j=1 pij =1for each i), λ is the spatial autoregressive
coeﬃcient and ξ is a N ×1 vector of normally distributed random error terms,
with means 0 and constant variances σ2.8
T h ec h o i c eo far e g r e s s i o nm o d e lt h a tc o n t r o l sf o rspatial dependence is
motivated by statistical consideration. Indeed, the estimation of a standard
regression model with diagnostics for spatial eﬀects provides strong evidence of
the presence of spatial dependence (see Appendix 4 for a detailed analysis on
this issue).9 Thus, in order to assess correctly the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients
of the variables of interest, this spatial dependence cannot be neglected.
On the other hand, the use of a spatial error model instead of a spatial
lag model is motivated by economic considerations. Indeed, from a behavioral
perspective, it makes little sense to estimate a spatial lag model in the context
o fo u rm o d e ls i n c ei ti m p l i e st h a ts e a r c hd e c i s i o n so fw o r k e r si nd i ﬀerent spatial
areas are jointly determined. On the other hand, both the theoretical model
and its empirical equivalent may miss some determinants of search activity, and
if these determinants are correlated across areas, then the spatial error model is
appropriate. For example, maybe (unobserved) road congestion deters search,
with congestion being high in highly urbanized areas, which may be spatially
adjacent, and low in less-urbanized areas, which are also spatially adjacent.10
As a result, we estimate the spatial error model (18)-(19). The Maximum
Likelihood estimation results (ML) on the target variables are reported in
Table 2, second column.11 For comparison purpose, the ﬁrst column of this
table display the OLS estimates that are obtained by estimating equation (18)
assuming spherical disturbances. A complete statistical analysis of model (18)-
(19), including estimation results for control variables and hypotheses tests, is
8The N × N matrix P = {pij} is sometimes called contiguity matrix in the spatial
statistics literature. It describes the geographical arrangement of the spatial units.
9In fact, a feature often neglected in regional studies, where the units have a spatial
connotation, is the possible cross-sectional dependence of the residuals.
10We are grateful to Jan Bruecker for providing this example.
11For details on the adaptation of the Maximum Likelihood estimator to this spatial case
and on the estimation procedure see, among others, Anselin (1988).
12c o n t a i n e di nA p p e n d i x4 . 12 We conclude that the spatial error model deﬁned
by (18)-(19) appears to be appropriate and correctly speciﬁed.
Let us now focus on the interpretation of the Maximum Likelihood estima-
tion results (column two of Table 2).






















*** signiﬁcant at 1%
** signiﬁcant at 5%
Control variables are included (see Table 4 in Appendix 4 for the complete results)
As predicted by the theoretical model, both the (local) cost of living h and
the (local) labor market tightness θ are found to have a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on unemployed search activity.T ob em o r ep r e c i s e ,au n i ti n c r e a s ei nt h e
cost of living in a county implies an increase of 0.09 in average search intensity
in the area;13 au n i ti n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g el e v e lo fl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s sθ
increases search eﬀort by 0.24.14
12All the estimation results have been obtained using SpaceStat version 1.80 (Anselin,
1995).
13Observe that, because the proxy used for (local) living costs is (local) house prices and
not an index of all the consumption goods, the eﬀect of the cost of living on search intensity
should be smaller. However, since housing constitutes an important part of the household
expenses, the diﬀerence should not be large.
14Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the empirical model and estimation methods are also been
considered. First, in order to control for a potential reverse causality between local search
rate and local cost of living this model speciﬁcation has also been estimated instrumenting
the houses prices by taking the historical prices. The ﬁrst period of the available series, last
term of 1998, has been used as instruments. Also, lag values of the labor market tightness
have been used as instruments for the values of the variable at time t to account for a
134C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine the link between the local search activity of unem-
ployed workers and residential characteristics, namely the local cost of living
and local labor market tightness. We ﬁrst develop a model that shows why
areas with large cost of living and/or high labor market tightness are character-
ized by high levels of search activities. The intuition is quite simple. When the
cost of living increases, workers consume less and thus have more leisure both
when they are employed and unemployed. However, because the employed
are assumed to value more leisure than the unemployed, the diﬀerence in in-
tertemporal utility between the employed and the unemployed increases, and
as a result, the unemployed workers search more actively because the reward
of a successful match is higher. Similarly, when the labor market tightness
possible endogeneity issue. Second to investigate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity
between areas and measurement errors in observed variables, we estimated a spatio-temporal
model speciﬁed as a typical dynamic panel data model. The available data prevent us to
perform a panel data analysis using a complete set of controls variables. We use all the





t + γϑt + η + ε,
s∗
t = st + mt,
h∗
t = ht + mt,t =1 ,...,9,
where the same deﬁnitions of model (18)-(19) apply, with the diﬀer-
ence that ε is now a white noise disturbance term and as proxy for
the cost of living, h, the Halifax price index (all data available on line:
http://www.hbosplc.com/view/housepriceindex/housepriceindex.asp) has been used,
because it is available at sub-regional level for a longer time period. In addition, st−1 is
the time lag for the search rate, η is a vector of time invariant area speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects,
variables denoted by ∗ represent the true latent variables and mt is a measurement error,
assumed to follow diﬀerent stochastic processes. After controlling for spatial dependence in
the data by choosing an appropriate order in the spatial process, the literature on dynamic
panel data models can be used. The model can be estimated using an instrumental variables
approach within a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure (Arellano
and Bond (1991)). Distributional assumptions are not needed. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations for
the measurement errors in observed variables can be taken into account by using suﬃciently
lagged variables as instruments.
For the purpose of this paper, i.e. the empirical test of the theoretical model, the inter-
esting result is that the estimation results related to the target variables (that is positive
and signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcients of local cost of living and local labor market tightness)
remain qualitatively unchanged across all the model speciﬁcations and estimation methods
used.
14rises, it becomes easier to ﬁnd a job (there are relatively more jobs available
compared to the unemployed) and thus the returns to search are higher. As a
result, workers put more eﬀort in search activities.
We then test these predictions on sub-regional data in England for the
year 2000 using a spatial lag model. Both the local cost of living and the local
labor market tightness are found to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
average unemployed labor market participation. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the prediction of the theoretical model.
We believe that these results have important implications for regional poli-
cies. Indeed, workers seem to search more actively in areas for which both
costs of living and labor market tightness are quite high. If we look again at
the maps described in Figure 1, then, not surprisingly, in England, these areas
are located in the southern part of the country. This suggests that policies
that aim at reducing local unemployment should be more active in the North
by, for example, subsidizing housing or inducing ﬁrms to set up there. This is
reinforced by the fact that spatial correlation is quite strong, i.e. high-search
intensity areas are in general adjacent to areas with the same characteristics.
This suggests that a relevant issue for future research could be to investigate
more closely the spatial interdependence between local labor markets.
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17Appendix 1: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Before proving this proposition, let us state the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique solution s∗
k to the ﬁrst order condition (16).
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Using (15) and (16), it is easy to check that



















Now, because C00(sk) > 0,a l lt h et e r m so fSOC are negative and thus SOC <
0.
Let us now prove Proposition 1.
First, observe that, at the symmetric equilibrium where s∗
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where SOC, the second order condition, is strictly negative by Lemma 1 and
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19Appendix 2: Description of variables
s : Ratio between unemployed and job seekers currently unavailable to
start working without a valid reason (not home-owners), and unemployed, job
seekers currently unavailable and inactive persons (not home-owners). Source:
LFS-INECA variable. It is a derived variable which classiﬁes the individual
economic activity according to the ILO standard deﬁnitions.
h: Index (ﬁxed weight) of house prices (construction detailed in Appendix
3). Source: HM Land Registry.
θ: Ratio between monthly unﬁlled vacancies and unemployed. Source:
NOMIS.
t: Ratio between total time spent travelling to jobs by employed workers,
and total number of employed. Source: LFS
c: Ratio between active job seekers owning or using a motor vehicle, and
total number of active job seekers. Source: LFS.
u:R a t i ob e t w e e nw o r k e r sw h oh a v eb e e nu n e m p l o y e df o rm o r et h a no n e
year and the total number of unemployed. Source: LFS.
a: ratio between men of working age economically active and men of work-
ing age (16-64). Source: LFS (available from NOMIS).
skills3+: ratio between economically active men above NVQ2 (NVQ3,
NVQ4 and higher)15 a n dw i t ho t h e rq u a l i ﬁcations and men of working age
economically active. Source: LFS (available from NOMIS).
y16 − 24: Men aged 16-24 over men aged more than 16. Source: LFS
(available from NOMIS).
y25 − 49: Men aged 25-49 over men aged more than 16. Source: LFS
(available from NOMIS).
y50 − 64: Men aged 50 up to retirement age over men aged more than 16.
Source: LFS (available from NOMIS).
e_123: All in employment working as managers, professional and techni-
cal occupations (SOC 1,2,3)16 over total number of employed. Source: LFS
15The NVQs are levels of vocational qualiﬁcations based on statements of performance
standards which describe what competent people in a particular occupation are expected
to be able to do. They are organised into ﬁve levels. For precise deﬁnitions see
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/nvq/.
16The Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (SOC) system, developed by the US Depart-
ment of Labor classiﬁes workers into occupational categories. Each broad occupation in-
cludes detailed occupations requiring similar job duties, skills, education, or experience (fur-
ther details in http://www.bls.gov/soc/home.htm). We use the classiﬁcation into 9 major
groups adopted by our data-source NOMIS.
20(available from NOMIS).
e_67: All in employment working as personal service, sales and customer
service occupations (SOC 6, 7) over total number of employed. Source: LFS
(available from NOMIS).
e_89: All in employment working as process, plant and machine operatives
and other elementary occupations (SOC 8, 9) over total number of employed.
Source: LFS (available from NOMIS).
whites :White men aged more than 16 over total men aged more than 16.
Source: LFS (available from NOMIS).
network: Men job seekers of working age that use friends and relatives as
main method of job search over total number of men job seekers of working
age. Source: LFS (available from NOMIS).
h_ow: Persons home owners over persons aged more than 16. Source:
LFS.
w_123:I n d e x ( ﬁxed weight) of earnings for managers, professional and
technical occupations (SOC 1,2,3) (construction detailed in Appendix 3). Source:
New Earnings Survey (available from NOMIS).
w_45:I n d e x( ﬁxed weight) of earnings for administrative, secretarial oc-
cupations and skilled trades (SOC 4, 5) (construction detailed in Appendix 3).
Source: New Earnings Survey (available from NOMIS).
w_67:I n d e x( ﬁxed weight) of earnings for personal service, sales and cus-
tomer service occupations (SOC 6, 7) (construction detailed in Appendix 3).
Source: New Earnings Survey (available from NOMIS).
w_89:I n d e x ( ﬁxed weight) of earnings for process, plant and machine
operatives and other elementary occupations (SOC 8, 9) (construction detailed
in Appendix 3). Source: New Earnings Survey (available from NOMIS).
d: Density: ratio of residents over squared hectometers. Variable taken
from the 1991 Census database and updated using the Midyear Population
Estimates. Source: NOMIS.
21Appendix 3: Index (ﬁxed weight) of earnings
and house prices
We consider four indices of earnings (listed in Appendix 2) that are based
on the major groups of the Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (SOC2000).
They are constructed as follow.














ηUKj = employed in sub group j in UK,
ηUK = total employed in UK,
wij = average hourly wage of employed in sub group j in area i,
wUKj = average hourly wage of employed in sub group j in UK.
Similarly, the house price index is constructed as follow.















ηUKj = sales of houses of type j in UK,
ηUK = total sales of houses in UK,
Pij = average price of houses of type j in area i,
PUKj = average price of houses of type j in UK.
22Appendix 4: Regression diagnostics
In this appendix we provide evidence that the statistical models deﬁned
by (18)-(19) is appropriate and correctly speciﬁed, and the complete list of
estimation results.
Let us consider Table 3. It has the same structure than Table 2 (results for
the spatial error model in the second column and for the classical regression
model in column one) and it reports measures of ﬁt and hypotheses tests. The
ﬁr s tr o wr e p o r t st h em a x i m i z e dl o gl i k e l i h o o d( L I K )a n dt h es e c o n da n dt h i r d
row contain two likelihood based measures of goodness of ﬁt: Akaike Infor-
mation Criteria (AIC) and Schwartz Criterion (SC). A range of speciﬁcation
diagnostics follows. When estimating a classical regression model (column one
and three), it consists of the Jarque-Bera test against non-normality (T1), the
Breusch-Pagan test against heteroskedasticity (T2), a Lagrange Multiplier test
on remaining spatial error autocorrelation (T3) and a Lagrange Multiplier test
on the spatial autoregressive coeﬃcient (T4). When estimating a spatial er-
ror model (column two and four), obviously we do not ﬁnd the statistic T1
(normality is assumed) and T4 (there is no spatially lagged dependent variable
included in the model speciﬁcation), there is still a Breush-Pagan test against
heteroskedasticity (T2) and a test on the spatial error autoregressive coeﬃcient
(T3), which is a Likelihood Ratio test in this case. In addition, we also ﬁnd
a Likelihood Ratio test (T5) and a Wald test (T6) on the common factor hy-
pothesis. These last two tests verify if the coeﬃcients satisfy the restrictions
needed to guarantee the consistency of the spatial error speciﬁcation. All the
statistics are asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared. They diﬀer in terms
of degrees of freedom. The T1 statistic presents two degree of freedom, both T3
and T4 statistics have one degree of freedom and T2,T 5 and T6 have as many
degrees of freedom as the number of regressors in the model.17
Let us focus our attention on the analysis of the speciﬁcation of model (18)-
(19). Looking at the diagnostics in column one (classical regression model),
the hypothesis of normality of the errors cannot be rejected (the T1 statistic
is not signiﬁcant). This implies that the other misspeciﬁcation tests (various
Lagrange multiplier tests), that depend on the normality assumption, can be
safely used. The T2 statistic is not signiﬁcant, providing no evidence of het-
eroskedasticity. On the contrary, both tests for spatial dependence (T3 and T4)
17For more details and a technical discussion of model validation in spatial regression
models (measures of ﬁta n ds p e c i ﬁcation diagnostics), see Anselin (1995).
23are highly signiﬁcant, indicating clearly the presence of spatial dependence ig-
n o r e di nt h em o d e l .A l t h o u g ht h eT4 statistic is slightly more signiﬁcant than
the T3 statistic, there is no clear indication to conclude which is the proper
alternative spatial model to use (spatial lag model or spatial error model).18
As discussed in Section 3.2, we choose the spatial-error model on the basis of
economic considerations.
Looking at column two (spatial error model), we can observe that the per-
formance of the spatial model has been improved with respect to the standard
regression model (column one) and it appears correctly speciﬁed. In fact, if we
compare the values of LIK, AIC and SC for this spatial model with the ones
reported in the ﬁrst column (standard regression model), we can observe an
increase in the value of LIK and a decrease in the value of AIC and SIC. This
is consistent with an evidence that the ﬁt of the model has been improved.
Furthermore, the T2 statistic is still not signiﬁcant, providing evidence that
there is no ignored heteroskedasticity in the model, the T3 statistic is highly
signiﬁcant and neither T5 nor T6 are signiﬁcant, indicating that the spatial
error speciﬁcation is appropriate.
If we compare the parameters estimates and associated standard errors in
column one and two of Table 2 (i.e. OLS of the standard regression model and
ML of the spatial error model), the point estimates are similar but there is a
gain in precision of the estimated coeﬃcients using a spatial error model.19
For completeness, Table 4 contains the estimation results for the control
variables. Quite intuitively, the search behavior of job seekers living in an
area appear to be positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the activity rate, the
percentage of young people and negatively and signiﬁcantly by the percentage
of old people and by the percentage of long-term unemployed in the area.
Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that having access to a private motor vehicle has a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on search intensity and that, on the other hand,
(time) distance to jobs has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect. These ﬁndings
suggest an important role of transport mode in shaping job seekers search
eﬀort decisions.
18Note that they are asymptotic tests whereas we deal with a small data set.
19Note that the consequences of ignoring spatial error dependence are not severe. OLS
estimators are still unbiased. However, they are ineﬃcient. Indeed, also using OLS estima-
tors our our main results, i.e. the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of cost of living and labor
market tightness on search intensity are qualitatively the same. The spatial error model has
been estimated mainly for robustness check.
24Table 3: Measures of ﬁt and Hypotheses tests
OLS ML

































- degrees of freedom in parentheses
- p-value in squared brackets
25Table 4: Estimation Results -complete model-
OLS ML


















































































































- *** signiﬁcant at 1%
-* *s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%
-*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%
27Appendix 5: List of NUTS3 administrative areas
1 Barnsley, Doncaster and Rotherham
2B e d f o r d s h i r e
3B e r k s h i r e
4 Birmingham
5 Blackburn with Darwen
6B l a c k p o o l
7 Bournemouth and Poole
8B r a d f o r d
9B r i g h t o na n dH o v e
10 Bristol, City of
11 Buckinghamshire
12 Calderdale, Kirklees and Wakeﬁeld
13 Cambridgeshire
14 Cheshire















30 Greater Manchester North
31 Greater Manchester South
32 Halton and Warrington
33 Hampshire
34 Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees
35 Herefordshire, County of
2836 Hertfordshire
37 Isle of Wight
38 Kent











50 North and North East Lincolnshire




























79 Walsall and Wolverhampton
80 Warwickshire
81 West Sussex
82 Wiltshire
83 Wirral
84 Worcestershire
85 York
30